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INTERPRETING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A "NON-ABSOLUTE
SEPARATIONIST" APPROACH
ROBERT L. CORD*
I. INTRODUCTION: ON THE USE OF ORIGINAL INTENT
Not too long ago, Justice Brennan told an assembled audi-
ence at Georgetown University that "[t]here are those who find
legitimacy in fidelity to what they call 'the intentions of the
Framers.' In its most doctrinaire incarnation, this view
demands that Justices [of the Supreme Court] discern exactly
what the Framers thought about the question under considera-
tion and simply follow that intention in resolving the case
before them."' Justice Brennan then charged that "[i]t is a
view that feigns self-effacing deference to the specific judg-
ments of those who forged our original social compact. But in
truth it is little more than arrogance cloaked as humility."2
My first impression after reading the speech was one of
disbelief. Was Justice Brennan charging that the "original
intent" opinions in Everson v. Board of Education 3-the first case
in which the U.S. Supreme Court comprehensively interpreted
the establishment clause-reflected arrogance? Was it arro-
gant when Justice Black's opinion of the Court in Everson
appealed to recognized historical authority, claiming that "[i]n
the words ofJefferson, the clause against establishment of reli-
gion was intended to 'erect a wall of separation between church
and State' "?4 And was Justice Black's conclusion about the
historical purpose of the first amendment arrogant? "The First
Amendment," Black concluded, "has erected a wall between
* University Distinguished Professor and Professor of Political
Science, Northeastern University.
1. Address by Associate Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan,
entitled "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,"
Georgetown University Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985),
reprinted in 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986).
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. Id. at 16 (emphasis added) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 90
U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
732 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregna-
ble. We could not approve the slightest breach."'
Had Justice Brennan forgotten that Justice Rutledge's
Everson dissent, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and
Burton, was almost entirely based on "original intent" argu-
ments?6 After detailing his version of the original intentions of
Madison and of those in the First Congress who authored and
supported what ultimately became the first amendment, Justice
Rutledge without any equivocation wrote:
The Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at
the official establishment of a single sect, creed or reli-
gion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had pre-
vailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily
it was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was
broader than separating church and state in this narrow
sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of
the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehen-
sively forbidding every form of public aid or support for
religion .... 7
Could it be thatJustice Brennan, who himself has appealed
to history in determining the prohibitions of the establishment
clause, was unthinkingly faulting others for doing likewise? Or
had Justice Brennan unknowingly re-embraced the contradic-
tion demonstrated so well in his concurring opinions in Murray
v. Curlett and Abington v. Schempp?8 There, after writing that he
found futile and misdirected a too literal quest for the advice of
the Founding Fathers, 9 Justice Brennan, in the same opinion,
later wrote:
5. Id. at 18.
6. Id. at 28-63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
8. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
9. A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon
the issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected for
several reasons: First, on our precise problem the historical record
is at best ambiguous, and statements can readily be found to support
either side of the proposition. The ambiguity of history is
understandable if we recall the nature of the problems uppermost in
the thinking of the statesmen who fashioned the religious
guarantees; they were concerned with far more flagrant intrusions of
government into the realm of religion than any that our century has
witnessed. While it is clear to me that the Framers meant the
Establishment Clause to prohibit more than the creation of an
established national church such as existed in England, I have no
doubt that, in their preoccupation with the imminent question of
established churches, they gave no distinct consideration to the
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
Specifically, I believe that the line we must draw between the
permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history
and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers.
It is a line which the Court has consistently sought to
mark in its decisions expounding the religious guarantees
of the First Amendment. What the Framers meant to
foreclose, and what our decisions under the Establish-
ment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of
religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the
essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b)
employ the organs of government for essentially reli-
gious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to
serve government ends, where secular means would suf-
fice. When the secular and religious institutions become
involved in such a manner, there inhere in the relation-
ship precisely those dangers-as much to church as to
state-which the Framers feared would subvert religious
liberty and the strength of a system of secular
government.
No, Justice Brennan needs no reminding about "original
intent" arguments when it comes to establishment clause law.
At Georgetown University, he was aware that the Supreme
Court has almost exclusively relied upon historical and "original
intent" arguments when fashioning its interpretation as to what
the establishment clause constitutionally precludes and per-
mits. " And frankly, I am tired of Justice Brennan's special
pleading, and the intellectual double standard of all those who
argue that appeals to history are unwarranted, futile, and even
arrogant, unless of course, they are the ones who make them.
On this score, however, Professor Pfeffer-my eminent
opponent in this dialogue and undoubtedly this nation's most
respected "absolute separationist" scholar-and I have no
quarrel. 2 We both have appealed to history in an honest
particular question whether the clause also forbade devotional
exercises in public institutions.
Id. at 237-38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 294-95 (emphasis added).
11. For an overview of how much the members and the opinions of the
Supreme Court have relied on history to justify their conclusions in
establishment clause cases, see Cord & Ball, The Separation of Church and State:
A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 895, 907-09 (1987).
12. Professor Leo Pfeffer has written numerous books about American
constitutional law, including: CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1967);
THE LIBERTIES OF AN AMERICAN (1956); THIS HONORABLE COURT (1965); with
Anson Phelps Stokes, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950); GOD,
CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1975); and RELIGION, STATE, AND THE
1990]
734 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
search to understand that great first amendment injunction:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion."' 3 And I hope it is not too presumptuous for me to
suggest that perhaps we do so for some of the same reasons.
Even though the Founding Fathers could not foresee many
twentieth and twenty-first century problems-especially those
growing out of advanced technology-much of the church-state
concerns which they addressed in their time are similar to those
we face today. Almost certainly they are variations on a com-
mon theme.
But further, one of the purposes of a written constitution
was to codify certain fundamental principles, in the hope that
they would constitute a precious legacy, never to be treated
lightly as irrelevant trivia by those who momentarily sit in the
seats of power. For at the least, constitutional government
requires that political power be defined and limited by law in
fact as well as in theory.' 4
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND ORIGINAL INTENT: THE
"ABSOLUTE SEPARATIONIST" INTERPRETATION
At the core of the absolute separationist approach to
church-state matters is a two-fold conviction. Absolutists main-
tain, first, that the establishment clause was intended by its
framers "to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehen-
sively forbidding every form of public aid or support for reli-
gion;"' 5 and second-paraphrasing Professor Pfeffer-that the
framers intended the clause to require that government seek to
achieve only secular ends, and in doing so to employ only secu-
lar means.16 Regarding both propositions, I think the absolut-
ists are in error; the historical evidence is simply against them.
BURGER COURT (1984). He has actively participated in the litigation of more
than half of all the establishment clause cases decided by the Supreme Court
since Everson, and was recently celebrated by the publication of RELIGION AND
THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER (J.E. Wood ed. 1985).
13. R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION (1988) [hereinafter SEPARATION]. (SEPARATION was first
published by Lambeth Press, New York, in 1982) Professor Pfeffer's major
"absolute separationist" historical conclusions in CHURCH, STATE, AND
FREEDOM, supra note 12, are compared with my own differing analysis in
SEPARATION, at 16-82.
14. See C.H. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 19-
22 (rev. ed. 1958).
15. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
16. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 63.
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
IfJefferson and Madison were absolute separationists, why
would Jefferson author a Virginia "Bill for Punishing Disturb-
ers of Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers,"' 7 sponsored
by Madison in the Virginia Assembly, 8 which became Virginia
17. 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 555-56 (J. Boyd ed. 1950),
[hereinafter PAPERS]. This volume includes the Revisal of the Laws, 1776-1786
[hereinafter Revisal]; Jefferson's bill is number 84 of the Revisal.
After declaring independence from Great Britain, a "Committee of
Revisors" was appointed by resolution of the General Assembly (printed
under the date 15 October 1776) to refashion Virginia's laws to reflect its
new status as a sovereign state. Those originally named to the Committee
included Thomas Jefferson, George Mason (who declined to serve), Thomas
Ludwell (who died before the Committee began its work), Edmund
Pendleton, and George Wythe. Jefferson, Pendleton, and Wythe did the
actual revision. See PAPERS, at 312.
18. Although Madison, acting as Jefferson's surrogate (Jefferson was
U.S. Minister to France during this period), introduced Bill #84 of the
Revisal during the Virginia Assembly meeting in 1785, the most accepted
theory is that Jefferson was responsible for drawing it up and revising it.
Boyd, Editorial Note 4, PAPERS, supra note 17, at 318-20. The text of Bill
#84 appears below as it was introduced by Madison:
84. A Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and
Sabbath Breakers
Be it enacted by the General Assembly, that no officer, for any
civil cause, shall arrest any minister of the gospel, licensed according
to the rules of his sect, and who shall have taken the oath of fidelity
to the commonwealth, while such minister shall be publicly
preaching or performing religious worship in any church, chapel, or
meeting-house, on pain of imprisonment and amercement, at the
discretion of a jury, and of making satisfaction to the party so
arrested.
And if any person shall of purpose, maliciously, or
contemptuously, disquiet or disturb any congregation assembled in
any church, chapel, or meeting-house, or misuse any such minister
being there, he may be put under restraint during religious worship,
by any Justice present, which Justice, if present, or if none be
present, then any Justice before whom proof of the offence shall be
made, may cause the offender to find two sureties to be bound by
recognizance in a sufficient penalty for his good behavior, and in
default thereof shall commit him to prison, there to remain till the
next court to be held for the same county; and upon conviction of
the said offence before the said court, he shall be further punished
by imprisonment and amercement at the discretion of a jury.
If any person on Sunday shall himself befound labouring at his own or
any other trade or calling, or shall employ his apprentices, servants or slaves in
labour, or other business, except it be in the ordinary houshold [sic] offices of
daily necessity, or other work of necessity or charity, he shall forfeit the sum of
ten shillings for every such offence, deeming every apprentice, servant, or slave
so employed, and every day he shall be so employed as constituting a distinct
offence.
PAPERS, supra note 17, at 555 (emphasis added).
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law in 1786 along with Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Reli-
gious Freedom."' 9
If Madison was an absolute separationist, why did he serve
as one of six members of a joint congressional committee
which, without recorded dissent, recommended the establish-
ment of a congressional chaplain system?2" If they were abso-
lutists, why would the First Congress-which authored the
establishment clause-adopt that joint committee's recommen-
dation and vote a $500 annual salary each for a Senate Chap-
lain and a House chaplain to offer paid public prayers in
Congress?2 ' Did the authors of the proposed religion amend-
ment not know what it meant? Or if they did, did they immedi-
ately proceed to violate it?
And if the establishment clause was understood to be an
absolute injunction, why did Presidents George Washington,22
John Adams23 and James Madison 24 issue discretionary procla-
mations of "Thanksgiving," prayer and fasting? 5 We know
that there was disagreement on this point because President
Jefferson thought they did violate the first amendment and
refused to issue them. 26 But Jefferson was in the decided
19. In all, the "Committee for the Revision of the Laws" prepared 126
bills for adoption. PAPERS, supra note 17, at 329-33. Among the bills
contained in the Revisal was Bill #82, "A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom," passed in 1786. Id. at 545-47.
20. ANNALS OF CONGRESS 104-05 (J. Gales ed. 1834) [hereinafter
ANNALS]; 2 REPORTS OF COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 4
(1854). In addition to Madison, the First House of Representatives also
chose Boudinot, Bland, Tucker, and Sherman to serve on this joint House-
Senate committee. Oliver Ellsworth was the only member of the Senate to
serve on the Committee. Id.
21. Chaplains in Congress and in the Army and Navy, H.R. Doc. No.
124, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. (1854), reprinted in 2 REPORTS OF COMMITTEES OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 4 (1854).
22. President Washington's Thanksgiving Proclamations of 1789 and
1795 are contained in their entirety in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789-1897 at 64, 179-80 J. Richardson ed.
1899) [hereinafter MESSAGES].
23. President Adams issued at least two such proclamations, one on
March 23, 1798, id. at 268-70, and another on March 6, 1799, id. at 284-86.
24. President Madison issued at least four proclamations, one on July 9,
1812, id. at 513; one on July 23, 1813, id. at 532-33; one on November 16,
1814, id. at 558; and one on March 4, 1815, id. at 560-61.
25.. Madison recanted his proclamations in an essay on monopolies,
written when out of office and late in life, generally referred to as the
"Detached Memoranda." Reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 103
(P. Kurland & R. Lerner ed. 1987), (1946). For an in-depth discussion of
Madison's essay, see Cord, Original Intent Jurisprudence and Madison's "'Detached
Memoranda, " 3 BENCHMARK 79 (1987).
26. In a letter to a Presbyterian clergyman in 1808, Jefferson indicated
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
minority as his immediate predecessors 27 and his immediate
successor did issue such proclamations. 28 Just to give you a fla-
vor of these proclamations, Madison's 1812 proclamation
called for a day "to be set apart for the devout purposes of
rendering to the Sovereign of the Universe and the Benefactor
of Mankind," identified by Madison in the proclamation as
Almighty God, "the public homage due to his holy
attributes. "29
And why, if an absolutist, would President Jefferson sign a
tax exemption bill for the churches in Alexandria County in
1802?3o And why, if an absolutist, would Jefferson-two years
after he wrote his famous "wall of separation" letter to the Dan-
bury, Connecticut Baptists 3 '-conclude a treaty with the Kas-
kaskia Indians which, in part, called for the United States to
that he thought Thanksgiving proclamations by the Federal government
would violate the establishment clause and federalism. He wrote:
I consider the government of the United States as interdicted by
the Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions,
their doctrines, discipline, or exercises. This results not only from
the provision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment
or free exercise of religion [sic], but from that also which reserves to
the States the powers not delegated to the United States. Certainly,
no power to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority
in religious discipline, has been delegated to the General
Government. It must then rest with the States, as far as it can be in
any human authority.
Quoted in 9 P.L. FORD, THE WORKS OF JEFFERSON 174 (1904).
27. See supra notes 22-23.
28. See supra note 24.
29. 1 MESSAGES, supra note 22, at 513.
30. 2 PUBLIC STATUTES AT LARGE 194, 7th Cong., 1st Sess., Chap. 52.
31. OnJanuary 1, 1802, President Jefferson sent a letter to the Danbury
Connecticut Baptist Association which contained the "wall of separation"
phrase noted below in the context of the entire paragraph in which it
appeared:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for
his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government
reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American People which declared that
their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall
of separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression of
the supreme will of the nation on behalf of the rights of conscience, I
shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments
which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has
no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Connecticut Baptist Association
(Jan. 1, 1802), quoted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (S. Padover ed.
1943) (emphasis added).
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build them a Roman Catholic Church and pay their priest. 2
And further, why would President Jefferson urge Congress to
appropriate the public funds to carry out the terms of that
treaty 3 if he thought that under all circumstances the first
amendment precluded spending U.S. tax dollars to build a
church and pay a congregation's spiritual leader?
And why, if absolutists, would Presidents George Wash-
ington, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson sign into law six
Congressional bills, which in effect purchased-with control-
ling trusts governing enormous land grants of federal property
in the Ohio Territory-the services of the "Society of the
United Brethren for propagating the Gospel among the
heathen?"
34
Whatever the original intention behind the establishment
clause, at least two conclusions are historically certain: First,
the first amendment was not intended to, nor did it in fact erect, a
high, impregnable and absolute wall of separation between
church and state; second, and let us make no mistake about it,
that amendment was intended in Jefferson's unembossed terms to
erect a "wall of separation between Church and State."'3 5 The
question then obviously becomes: What is the extent of that
separation?
Unlike absolute separationists, I, as a "non-absolute sepa-
rationist," believe that, taken together, the resolutions passed
by the New York, 6 Virginia,37 Maryland, 8 North Carolina, °
32. 7 PUBLIC STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 30, at 78.
33. 1 MESSAGES, supra note 22, at 365. -
34. For the complete texts of these six federal land laws, see R. CORD,
supra note 13, at 42-45, 263-70.
35. Supra note 31.
36. The New York Convention similarly declared:
That the people have an equal, natural, and unalienable right
freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that no religious sect or society ought to be
favored or established by law in preference to others.
I J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (1901) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
37. The Virginia Ratifying Convention proposed a "Declaration or Bill
of Rights" as amendments to the Constitution, Article Twenty of which
(adopted on June 27, 1788) stated:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men have an
equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious
sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to others.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 659 (emphasis added).
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
and Rhode Island state ratifying conventions, 40 the original
draft of Madison's religion amendment,4 the debates within
the First House and Senate, Madison's final statement on the
floor of the First House of Representatives, 42 and many gov-
ernmental actions during the formative years of our Federal
Republic indicate that the establishment clause was intended
by its framers to prevent the establishment of a national church
or religion, or the placing of any one religious sect, religious
denomination, or religious tradition into a preferred legal sta-
tus-a status that was intrinsic to the religious establishments
from which many of them or their ancestors had fled.43
III. NON-ABSOLUTE SEPARATIONISM AND THE "No
PREFERENCE" DOCTRINE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
For me, the major difference between an "absolute separa-
tionist" such as Professor Pfeffer, and a "non-absolute separa-
tionist" such as myself, has little to do with the ends of
government. I do not now dispute-nor to the best of my recol-
38. The Maryland Ratifying Convention proposed an amendment
stating: "That there be no national religion established by law; but that all persons
be equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty." 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 36, at 553 (emphasis added).
39. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 244.
40. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 334.
41. Madison's original wording of the establishment clause read as
follows: "The Civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full
and equal rights of Conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext,
infringed." 1 ANNALS, supra note 20, at 434 (emphasis added).
42. When asked how he defined the protections of the religion clauses
of the proposed amendment the record indicates that:
.Mr. Madison said, he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it
by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to
their conscience. Whether the words are necessary or not, he did
not mean to say, but they had been required by some of the State
Conventions, who seemed to entertain an opinion that under the
clause of the Constitution, which gave power to Congress to make
all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the
Constitution, and the laws made under it, enabled them to make
laws of such a nature as might infringe the rights of conscience, and
establish a national religion; to prevent these effects he presumed the
amendment was intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of
the language would admit.
Id. at 730 (emphasis added). Further, Madison said that "he believed that the
people feared that one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine
together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to Con-
form." Id. at 731.
43. See generally R. CORD, supra note 13, chs. 1, 2 and 3.
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lection have I ever disputed-that under our amended Constitution
the goals of government must be secular. On this point, I doubt that
many constitutional scholars would disagree. While the first
amendment initially prohibited a national religious establish-
ment and its essential trappings, the Supreme Court's incorpo-
ration of the first amendment into the fourteenth now similarly
binds the states.""
Starting with the First Congress, I believe that the concept
of separation of church and state has mainly addressed itself to
the constitutionality of using sectarian institutions or activities
associated with religion as means to achieve appropriate secular
governmental ends. When the authors of the first amendment
requested President Washington to issue his first
"Thanksgiving Day" Proclamation, one day after they voted up
the establishment clause,"5 I do not think they saw those two
acts as incongruous. Instead, I think, with a religious procla-
mation, they were pursuing a secular goal, hoping that Wash-
ington's action would help unite the nation behind the new
government and the new Constitution. I submit that their
intent is reasonably clear from the debate in the House"6 and
the content of Washington's Proclamation of 1789.1 7 Similarly,
44. See id. at ch. 4.
45. On Thursday, September 24, 1789, the First House of
Representatives voted by 37-14 to recommend what is now the first
amendment to the states for ratification. 1 ANNALS, supra note 20, at 947-48.
The next day, Friday, September 25, 1789, the House asked President
Washington to issue his first Thanksgiving Day Proclamation. Id. at 949.
46. Id. at 949-50.




Whereas it is the duty of all nations to acknowledge the
providence of Almighty God, to obey His will, to be grateful for His
benefits, and humbly to implore His protection and favor; and
Whereas both Houses of Congress have, by -their joint
committee, requested me "to recommend to the people of the
United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be
observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal
favors of Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity
peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and
happiness:"
Now, therefore, I do recommend and assign Thursday, the 26th
day of November next, to be devoted by people of these States to
the service of that great and glorious Being who is the beneficent
author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be; that we may
then all unite in rendering unto Him our sincere and humble thanks
for His kind care and protection of the people of this country
ESTABLISHMENT CLA4USE
I think that they voted for paid prayer in Congress because they
were a religious people who thought that prayer was a means to
reach the secular goal of enlightened policies and legislation
yielding a prosperous nation and stable government, much
desired after the "critical years" under the Articles of Confed-
eration.48 They apparently saw no church-state violation there.
I would further submit that when Jefferson thought it
desirable to provide tax exemption to benevolent institutions,
including churches, he did so because they were viewed as
legitimate means of serving the community, and the nation
largely continues that practice today.
When Jefferson used the Catholic Church in the Kaskaskia
Treaty to provide for friendship with those Indians 49 and to get
them to cede their lands to the United States,5" he no more saw
previous to their becoming a nation; for the signal and manifold
mercies and the favorable interpositions of His providence in the
course and conclusion of the late war; for the great degree of
tranquility, union, and plenty which we have since enjoyed; for the
peaceable and rational manner in which we have been enabled to
establish constitutions of government for our safety and happiness,
and particularly the national one now lately instituted; for the civil
and religious liberty with which we are blessed, and the means we
have of acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge; and, in general,
for all the great and various favors which He has been pleased to
confer upon us.
And also that we may then unite in most humbly offering our
prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations,
and beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions;
to enable us all, whether in public or private stations, to perform our
several and relative duties properly and punctually; to render our
National Government a blessing to all the people by constantly
being a Government of wise, just, and constitutional laws, discreetly
and faithfully executed and obeyed; to protect and guide all
sovereigns and nations (especially such as have shown kindness to
us), and to bless them with good governments, peace, and concord;
to promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue,
and the increase of science among them and us; and, generally, to
grant unto all mankind such a degree of temporal prosperity as He
alone knows to be best.
Given under my hand, at the city of New York, the 3d day of
October, A.D. 1789.
Go. Washington
1 MESSAGES, supra note 22, at 64.
48. For a concise view of the turmoil in the United States under the
Articles of Confederation, see S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE, 297-316 (1965).
49. See text accompanying note 32.
50. On October 17, 1803, in his Third Annual Message to the
Congress, President Jefferson indicated that the "friendly tribe of Kaskaskia
Indians," through a treaty, had chosen to transfer its "country" to the United
1990]
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his acts as impermissibly aiding religion, or violating the estab-
lishment clause, than when he, Washington, and Adams used
the "Society of the United Brethren for propagating the Gospel
among the heathen" to aid in dealing with the Christian and
other Indians in the Ohio Territory.5' If Jefferson had seen
those acts as unconstitutional, I believe he would not have sent
those treaty provisions to the Senate, just as he declined to
issue Thanksgiving Day Proclamations.52 Instead, I think that
Jefferson considered the goals of those foreign policy actions
secular and thus constitutional, even if the institutions used to
achieve them were sectarian. In this, I think, he saw no viola-
tion of the establishment clause.
IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
LETrING LEMON Go
After almost a quarter century of Everson-style history and
decisions, church-state law was distilled into a "three prong"
test for determining alleged violations of the establishment
clause. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,53 decided in 1971, the Court held
that in order to pass constitutional muster under the establish-
ment clause, the challenged governmental policy or activity
must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) be one that has a principal
or primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion.54
Much can be said about the Lemon test, but I have little
time. Suffice it to say that few on the present Supreme Court
seem happy with it: ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice White
have alternately renounced it, re-embraced it, and renounced it
States. 1 MESSAGES, supra note 22, at 359. On October 31, 1803, Jefferson
asked the Senate for their advice on and consent to the treaty: "I now lay
before you the treaty mentioned in my general message at the opening of the
session as having been concluded with the Kaskaskia Indians for the transfer
of their country to us under certain reservations and conditions." Id. at 363.
51. See supra note 34.
52. For Jefferson's refusal to issue Thanksgiving proclamations, see
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
53. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
54. Id. at 612-13.
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again;55 Justices Brennan and Marshall would like to add to it;5 6
and Justice O'Connor would like to reinterpret it.
57
Because I believe that Lemon jeopardizes fundamental con-
stitutional rights and does not reflect the original intent of the
establishment clause, I would abandon it altogether. Instead in
establishment clause cases, I would urge a return to the test of
constitutionality developed by Chief Justice John Marshall in
the celebrated case of McCulloch v. Maryland.58
In McCulloch, Marshall advanced the following criteria for
judging acts alleged to be unconstitutional. "Let the end be
legitimate," Marshall wrote, "let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are no1 prohibited, but con-
sist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional."59 How would a return to Marshall's test affect present
church-state issues?
Assuming that we are well past the day when any official
religion would be declared by government, if I were on the
bench, as a non-absolute separationist using Marshall's criteria,
I would ask three basic questions in cases where a violation of
the establishment clause is alleged. First, is the governmental
action within the constitutional power of the acting public
body? Second, is the governmental action religiously nonparti-
san in that it does not elevate any religion, religious sect or
religious tradition into a preferred legal status? Third, is there
a reasonable or rational ends-means relationship? An answer
of "no" to any of these questions would nullify the governmen-
tal action as unconstitutional.
Application of these standards in the public schools would
probably bring fewer changes than one might expect, and none
that I think we need rationally fear. Recitation of the "Lord's
Prayer" or readings taken solely from the New Testament would
55. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976)
(White, J. concurring). Then Justice Rehnquist joined White's opinion. In
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980), Justice White re-embraced the Lemon test and wrote the Court's
deeply divided (5-4) opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Rehnquist joined White's opinion. Id. But see Wallace v. Jaifree
472 U.S. 38, 90-91 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) and id. at 91-114
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 374 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
57. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67-84 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
58. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
59. Id. at 421.
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still be unconstitutional, since they place the Christian religion
into a preferred position.6 ° Because they place the Judeo-
Christian tradition into a favored religious status, unconstitu-
tional also would be the posting of only the Ten Command-
ments or readings from the Old Testament.6 Unendorsed
readings or postings from many writings considered sacred by
various religions, however, would not be unconstitutional. A
decision to teach only "Creationism" or Genesis would be
unconstitutional,62 while a course in cosmology exploring a full
range of beliefs as to the origin of life or the nature of the uni-
verse-religious, areligious, nonreligious or even irreligious-
would not violate the Constitution any more than would a
course on comparative religions without teacher endorsement.
In sum, where the state is pursuing a valid educational goal,
and is religiously nonpartisan in doing so, the professional leader-
ship of the educational unit would decide-as with any other mat-
ter of policy-whether such an activity was educationally
appropriate or desirable.
Additionally, while no criteria for deciding difficult consti-
tutional questions provide a panacea, the substitution of the
McCulloch standards6 3 for those of Lemon 64 would also serve to
reduce the current stress between the establishment clause and
other equally fundamental constitutional liberties. An example
of such stress can be found in the Third Circuit court decision
in Bender v. Williamsport.65
In Williamsport, faithful adherence to Lemon led the Third
Circuit court to hold that it was constitutional for a school
board to refuse to permit a student-initiated nondenomina-
tional prayer club to meet in a public school room during the
regularly scheduled activity period. The establishment clause
required this denial, the Court said, "because the presence of
religious groups within the school during the curricular day has
the effect of advancing religion, in that it communicates a
message of government endorsement of such activity."
66
60. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 211 (1963).
61. Id. at 205, 207, 211.
62. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
64. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
65. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir.
1984).
66. Id. at 541. While the Third Circuit Court dealt with the "equal
access" question, the Supreme Court did not reach that constitutional issue
because one of the parties to the suit in the circuit court lacked standing, and
Justice Stevens' opinion of the Court held that the circuit court should have
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As I see it, the interpretation of church-state separation
which the circuit court followed in Williamsport not only created
the entire "equal access" controversy in the first place, but also
made subservient to an absolute construction of the establish-
ment clause three first amendment freedoms: those of reli-
gious free exercise, free speech, and voluntary assembly. The
net result of using the Lemon test in the "equal access" cases
has yielded nothing less than a distortion of first amendment
law by which long heralded rights-thought to be so funda-
mental to an open and free society as to be placed into a consti-
tutionally "preferred position" 6 7-have been subordinated to
an almost absolute establishment clause. This unfortunate
" 'preferred position' within the 'preferred position of the First
Amendment' "--established without any clear reason or com-
pelling legal justification-has enormous negative potential for
cherished constitutional rights. One wonders whether civil lib-
ertarians would have made an equally vigorous protest against
the recent Supreme Court decision in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,68 if what had been censored from the publicly funded
school student newspaper were articles by students discussing
the reasons for their personal religious beliefs or lack
thereof?69 More such Williamsport-like first amendment "victo-
ries" can virtually leave much of that amendment's fundamen-
tal liberties undone.
If equal access would be guaranteed to all religious-or,
for that matter, areligious and irreligious-student groups
under the same conditions that apply to any other voluntary
student group, I would see no violation of the establishment
clause; nor do I see the need in circumstances like those in Wil-
dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 549 (1986).
The constitutionality of public schools refusing "equal access" to
voluntary student religious organizations had been litigated in other federal
circuits. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock
Independent School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1155 (1983). The lower federal courts in deciding equal access cases have
used the Lemon test.
67. Perhaps the most eloquent defense for creating a different
constitutional status for the first amendment freedoms of speech, press,
worship and assembly is Justice Jackson's opinion in West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
68. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
69. "One of the stories described three Hazelwood East students'
experiences with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on
students at the school." Id. at 565.
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liamsport virtually to nullify other equally fundamental first
amendment rights.
70
Can we not see that, if under Lemon a court can hold today
that a completely voluntary religious student group may not
meet as a club in a public school room because "it has the effect
of advancing religion," it can also on another day, using the
same logic, deny meeting rooms requested by students who
want to discuss atheism, or a book negative about religion, such
as Bertrand Russell's Why I Am Not a Christian,7 because the
effect there might be said to inhibit religion?
And can we not see the chilling effect that Lemon can have
on the decisions of insecure public school personnel? Books
about religion or those said to be irreligious might be plucked
from our public school libraries or never even purchased. Is
C.S. Lewis' The Screwtape Letters safe?72 What about Inherit the
Wind?73 The Old and the New Testaments? The Koran? The Book
of Mormon or Charles Darwin's Origin of Species?7 1 Is the scru-
tinization of ultimate issues and values in public schools to be
hampered or disallowed altogether because we are so fright-
ened of ourselves?
Finally, I want to say a few words about the constitutional-
ity of what some have called "parochiaid. ' ' 75 If Thomas Jeffer-
son constitutionally was able to use sectarian means to achieve
secular ends, why is it unconstitutional for the states of the
Union, if they so choose, to do the same? Almost all of the "aid
to church school" cases 76 are merely contemporary examples
of the states using sectarian institutions to reach the secular
goal of educating their students-a goal, I hasten to add, that
was also undertaken with a similar methodology when the fed-
70. This apparently was also the view of the 98th Congress, which
passed the Equal Access Act of 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-377). This Act makes it
unlawful for any public high school receiving federal aid to deny all-voluntary
student groups, including religious ones, from meeting in school facilities
before and after class hours or during a club period, if other extracurricular
groups are given such access. 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPORT 1545, 1580; 43
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPORT 1807.
71. B. RUSSELL, WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN (1957).
72. C.S. LEWIS, THE SCREWTAPE LETrERS (1943).
73. J. LAWRENCE & R.E. LEE, INHERIT THE WIND (1955).
74. C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
75. The term "Parochiaid" is frequently used by Americans United for
Separation of Church and State in their monthly periodical CHURCH AND
STATE. It appears to be a generic term to describe all public assistance to
sectarian schools whether directly or indirectly. See "Index," 41 CHURCH AND
STATE 262 (1988).
76. R. CORD, supra note 13, at 194-211.
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eral government sent millions, if not billions, of dollars directly
to church-affiliated schools, colleges, universities and even in
some cases seminaries and yeshivas, to pay the tuition and
other educational expenses of America's veterans. Was all that
a violation of the first amendment? I would submit that it was a
constitutional act of a grateful nation.
Justice Brandeis once warned that "[m]en feared witches
and burnt women." 7 7 Can it be that today we fear indoctrina-
tion and endanger learning? Can it be that our legitimate fears
of past bigotry now make us indifferent to young minds bur-
dened with learning disorders because they have exercised
their constitutional right to go to a sectarian school?7 8 Can it
be that the monstrous religious evils of many centuries are
even now so debilitating that we are still their captives?
Thomas Jefferson, not indifferent to the fundamental
needs of all of his native Virginians, made sure that the facilities.
of the public university that he founded would be available
where needed to the sectarian institutions "adjacent to its pre-
cincts" and especially to their students.7 9 Perhaps Jefferson
had a conviction that where education is truly available, one
need not unduly worry about the flourishing of hatred or blind
dogma.
77. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
78. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
79. The relevant passages ofJefferson's Regulations for the University
of Virginia read:
Should the religious sects of this State, or any of them,
according to the invitation held out to them, establish within, or
adjacent to, the precincts of the University, schools for instruction in
the religion of their sect, the students of the University will be free,
and expected to attend religious worship at the establishment of
their respective sects, in the morning, and in time to meet their
school in the University at its stated hour.
The students of such religious school, if they attend any school
of the University, shall be considered as studeats of the University,
subject to the same regulations, and entitled to the same rights and
privileges.
Quoted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON, supra note 31, at 1110.
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